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AD HOC REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE ON PROJECT CHALICE (ARC)

**Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 538
Matomic Building, Central Intelligence Agency
at 10:00 a.m., 19 June 1958**

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P R E S E N T

[redacted]
Acting Chairman

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Colonel Clair S. Keena, OACSI
Major Ralph T. Hunt, OACSI
Major Donald Conroy, ONI
Mr. Edward C. Nielsen, ONI
Colonel Ridgely D. Kemp, AFCIN

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1. The Acting Chairman referred to the necessary security clearances for the ARC meeting stating it was his understanding that as a result of his earlier alert to ARC members such clearances were assured. He referred briefly to the current Lebanese crisis and the direction to Operations from the SA/PD/DCI that CHALICE support in covering the situation be accomplished. [redacted] later pointed out that this coverage was being performed without adding a substantial burden to Operations above and beyond their normal training operations.

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25X1A9A 2. As a result of this instruction from the SA/PD/DCI to [redacted] on late Monday afternoon, 16 June 1958, a flight had been ordered and completed and the [redacted] Report, #1416, was now in the hands of consumers. On Tuesday, 17 June 1958, the Acting Chairman and [redacted] arranged for intelligence support of Project Operations, and an intelligence briefing was provided by [redacted] A CIA/Air Force coordinated message was dispatched to [redacted] (anticipating 1416) setting forth:

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a. Specific last minute intelligence guidance for PI purposes, and

b. For immediate future planning purposes an estimate of three flights weekly in the Middle East area based upon the Lebanese crisis.

At the same time ARC member officers were requested by the office of the Acting Chairman to provide their requirements in code against the basic list. This was completed and placed in the hands of Project Operations and HTAUTOMAT.

Current Intelligence Support of Project Operations During the Lebanese Crisis

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3. [] of OCI provided the current intelligence picture as of the minute and based upon interagency watch, other discussions and all sources from last Friday on through this morning inclusive of the latest information available to his immediate office. Although that briefing is not reported in these minutes, it is noted that some parts of it were extremely sensitive and should be so considered by those present. [] was careful to mention this at appropriate times during his briefing.

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4. Due to the critical nature of the Lebanese crisis, it was agreed that any ARC member with current intelligence information which he deemed useful to Project Operations would immediately provide such intelligence to [] in Project Operations (code 143 extension [])

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Urgent Intelligence Requirements on Lebanese Crisis

5. It was agreed that during off duty hours if any ARC member deemed a requirement to be of an extremely urgent nature he would call that requirement directly to [] or his watch in Project Operations; and that such requirement would be repeated during the next duty hours to the office of the Chairman of the ARC. During duty hours such urgent requirements would be called to the office of the Chairman of the ARC. In the first case (off duty), Project Operations agreed to consider the requirement as one to be included in any flight undertaken given the

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necessary weather break but without effect upon the basic requirements as agreed by the ARC. In case of conflict between new urgent requirements and already established ARC requirements (necessitating a decision on which requirement to cover), the question would be put to the Acting Chairman of the ARC.

ARC Position with Regard to Coverage
of Middle East During the Lebanese Crisis

6. In opening the meeting the Acting Chairman had referred to the position of the ARC vis-a-vis coverage of the Middle East, i.e., that the ARC had not recommended coverage but that if CHALICE were to undertake flights the ARC would present its requirements. The Navy stated its position in strongest terms that the situation in the Middle East was so critical that it wanted CHALICE coverage. The Acting Chairman polled the ARC members with the following results: The Air Force stated it subscribed to the Navy position albeit with perhaps somewhat less emphasis; CIA/OCI and the Army concurred with the Navy position. Therefore, the ARC position vis-a-vis CHALICE coverage of the Lebanese crisis in the Middle East is that of recommending such coverage. The Acting Chairman stated and records herein that this position is taken without prejudice to the higher priority targets of the Communist Bloc. 25X1A9A

7. It was agreed that all members would provide to [] of HTAUTOMAT a list of designees (special duty officers) to receive [] information as soon as available on a twenty-four hour basis. 25X1A

CHALICE Capability

25X1A9A 8. [] Director of Operations DPS/DCI, briefed those present on the flight undertaken as a result of the directive he was given on 16 June 1958 resulting in [] and operational capabilities up to a possible three flights per week during the present Lebanese crisis. 25X1

Ground Observation Reporting

9. The Army requested that any information observed by Project personnel around their base (it was done last fall) be made available to the Army. The Navy pointed out the hazard of a requirement upon Project

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personnel to report on activities in a friendly post area. [] pointed out that these reports were spontaneous without direction and when they came in last fall they were immediately prepared and disseminated to the intelligence community. The Acting Chairman asked Project Operations if it in concert with HTAUTOMAT could send out such a request couched with extreme caution; that in no way was this a collection requirement but to be only a by-product prepared by personnel stationed in the base area. This message would not be sent without clearance, however, from the appropriate CIA division and [] would follow up and advise the Acting Chairman as appropriate.

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TALENT-CHALICE Security

(Reference: [])

10. [] Security Officer DPS/DCI, advised the members of the ARC that he now had the Army list (see reference), requested that Air Force and Navy submit their lists as soon as possible and made the further point that we will try to give immediate reply. However, to ensure prompt response [] urged submission on a hand carry basis. Further, members should consider CHALICE approvals as not given until this procedure has been completed with formal response.

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[]
Acting Chairman
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee

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Regular ARC Distribution